AWS Security Token Service (STS) is a web service that enables you to request temporary, limited-privilege credentials for AWS Identity and Access Management (IAM) users or for federated users. Federation is creating a trust relationship between an identity store like Amazon, Facebook, Google (also called an IdP), Active Directory, IAM, any SAML 2.0 system and AWS. Users are authenticated with the Federated indentity store FIRST before they hit AWS.
The common steps to federation at runtime are:
Authenticate with Identity Provider
Obtain Temporary Security Credentials - Done by calling STS. STS returns session credentials, AKID, Secret Access Key, Session Token, & Expiration.
Access the AWS resource by passing in the STS provided credentials - now, based the users’ role, you have access to AWS Resources using the session credentials issued by STS.
There are several use cases for STS including Corporate ID federation, Web Identity federation, and Cross account federation. The other sort of odd, less commonly thought of, use case for STS is in roles assigned to EC2 instance or other AWS services on your behalf.
Corporate Identity Federation
Overall, the approach is to map user groups from the directory service to IAM roles, then have the user assume the role AFTER authentication with the IdP… typically LDAP or AD.
The Console Access with Broker and the API Access with Broker scenarios need an identity proxy that must communicate with the IdP and STS and hold an IAM user credentials and more. Storing these credentials on a server that can be compromised is not ideal.
AssumeRole with SAML implementation method does not require a dedicated proxy and generally a better fit with more corporate scenarios.
Console Access with Broker
Use Case: SSO to IAM console access using local directory service; no SAML
Flow: User Requests browses to proxy; auth against directory which returns group membership; proxy gets list of roles from groups via STS; user selects role; proxy calls
STS:AssumeRole then returns auth package; proxy generates console redirect.
Con: IAM user required for proxy server
API Access with Broker
Use Case: an app needs access to AWS resources via API; no SAML
Flow: App requests session from proxy; auth against directory which returns entitlements; proxy requests session from STS using
STS:GetFederationToken; STS returns session; app calls AWS API using session
Cons: The IAM user associated to the proxy must have
GetFederationToken policy and all the premissions for all of the users; and
GetFederationToken does not support MFA
AssumeRole with SAML
Use Case: SSO to IAM console without proxy server against AD or other SAML IdP
Background: AD and it’s hosted version AWS Directory Service, LDAP and SAML can be integrated into IAM; generally you map groups in the ID provider to IAM roles
Flow: Auth with IdP which returns SAML token; with token in-hand the user is redirected to AWS sign-in endpoint for SAML at
https://signin.aws.amazon.com/saml; the endpoint calls
AssumeRoleWithSAML then creates and passes the user a console URL redirect; Roles must be configured to include the “saml:group”: “groupname”
Pro: No dedicated proxy on the corporate side and the proxy requires no IAM user or permissions
Web Identity Federation
Using the Social Identity Provider, which is an IAM object that holds configuration info about the external provider, this feature enables users to use a well-known authentication provider then use that ID to assume an IAM role.
After the first call from the app to STS, it returns a temporary security credential including an access key/secret key pair (just like AWS does) and a session token. The AWS STS API call
AssumeRole requests a temporary security credential - you will want to save these credentials for the length of the session and request new ones before they expire.
Web Identity (Standard)
Without using Cognito, the user auths with a web IdP; using the auth’d ID then calls the
AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity; STS validates the auth evaluates the Role/Trust policy then returns the AWS credentials.
Web Identity Provider Access to DynamoDB (or other AWS Services)
Many times users are authenticated by an IdP then need access to AWS services. As example of how this works, granting user access to DynamoDB steps are:
Authenticate with IdP (Receive Token from ID provider)
App calls STS with
AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity& passes in provider token and ARN for IAM role.
STS returns access key, secret access key, the token and a duration for a period of 15 minutes to 1 hours. 1 hour is the default.
The application then using the returns info to access DynamoDB by adding the session token to the HTTP header or adding it to the query string parameter
WIF with Cognito
Cognito pools enable multiple providers IDs to be stored and treated uniformally. Generally two roles are associated with the pool: one for authenticated users and one for unauthenticated users. If the an unauth’d user authenticates, or reauths with a different ID the IDs can be merged.
Cognito Unauthenticated - using this flow the user creates a new unauthenticated user in the Cognito pool then requests an OpenID token; client calls
STS:AssumeRoleto swap the OpenID token out for a role; STS verifies the request and issues credentials.
Cognito Authenticated Classic (Simple) - this flow is exactly the same as the Web Identity (Standard) flow except it handles a single pool of users, unauth’d to auth’d flow and abstracts away some of the complexity from handling more than one IdP.
Cognito Authenticated Enhanced (Simplfied) - this flow removes several steps in the auth process. Client auths with IdP; client does a get or create ID with Cognito which validates the auth; client requests credentials for ID from Cognito; Cognito returns the goods